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Whenever I have most carefully revised my 
moral (or philosophical) standards, I am 
always able to see... that at best I have been 
finding out, in some new light, the true 
meaning that was latent in old traditions. 
...Revision does not mean mere destruction. 
Josiah Royce l 
Although I am not a Royce scholar, it is this 
quotation that best sums up my efforts regarding animal 
rights issues, in particular, and regarding philosophic 
issues, in general. All of the seemingly non-traditional 
positions I have at one point or another defended are 
rooted in the work I have done interpreting traditional 
sources in the history of Platonism and in the history of 
religious thought. My views (regarding animal rights, 
theism, pacifism,2 transcendentalism, mysticism,3 
romanticism) can be referred to as neoclassical. They 
are "neo" precisely because they are built on a careful 
consideration of "classical" sources. 
Two works of mine illustrate the quotation from 
Royce with respect to animal rights issues. The first, 
The Philosophy of Vegetarianism,4 is an attempt to 
rethink the widespread belief that concern for animals 
is a recent thing born in the nineteenth century. In fact, 
I believe that a sizable number of the ancient 
philosophers were either themselves vegetarian or 
thought highly of vegetarianism (Pythagoras,  
. Empedocles, Plato, Theophrastus, Seneca, Ovid, 
.Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, etc.). Along with Judith 
Barad, I think that ancient concern for animals, if not 
for vegetarianism, lasted well into the medieval period,S 
although it must be admitted that (Aristotelian) 
anthropocentrism was not unknown in antiquity, and it 
was even more prominent in the middle ages than in 
the ancient period. 
Appreciation for the best in the pre-modem world, 
however, is not the same as anti-modernism. Study of 
the ancient world, in general, and of ancient attitudes 
toward animals, in particular, reveals that: (1) the 
commendable modem concentration on rights, and on 
the development of liberation movements based on 
the rights of racial minorities, women, and animals, 
were not pre-modern phenomena, hence there is a 
certain superiority to the modem period over the pre-
modern one; and (2) the modern commodification of 
animals and the view of nature as inert material 
resource creates exploitation of animals never dreamt 
of in antiquity. That is, both the ancient and medieval 
worlds, on the one hand, and the modern and 
contemporary worlds, on the other, should be taken 
with several grains of salt. 
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I should note that the title to The Philosophy of 
Vegetarianism is defective in that it gives no indication 
of the fact that it is a book about ancient philosophy, 
but the title does have the virtue (as the editor who 
suggested the title promised it would) of getting 
attention for the work. Forty-nine reviews of the book 
have appeared in journals in any number of disciplines, 
philosophy, classics, biology, etc., and the book has 
received awards. Most of these reviews were positive, 
but even the negative ones pleased me in that, as a 
defender of Karl Popper's method of bold hypothesis 
and severe refutation, I found that the attempted 
refutations made me aware of where, say, my bold views 
regarding Plato really were strong and where they 
needed improvement.6 
The other work that illustrates the quotation from 
Royce is my Hartshorne and the Metaphysics ofAnimal 
Rights.? This book is an attempt to show that animal 
rightist critiques of anthropocentrism are not only 
consistent with but are actually required by religious 
belief, in that such belief indicates some sort of 
commitment to theocentrism rather than to anthro-
pocentrism. Charles Hartshorne, the focus of this book, 
provides an excellent example of the connection 
between theism and anti-anthropocentrism in that he is 
both one of the great metaphysicians and philosophers 
of religion in the twentieth century as well as a noted 
ornithologist. 8 For too long, theists, including 
intelligent theists, have made God into something of 
a tyrant and then imitated this supposed divine tyranny 
in their own relations with animals. This book is an 
attempt to rethink these issues. 
From the above, one might assume that I was 
originally led to an animal rights position due to a 
. reading of some classic or other in the history of Greek 
philosophy or in the history of religion. But this is not 
the case. I was "converted" to the animal rights 
movement by the thought of Peter Singer, whom I 
assume is an atheist or agnostic. I read Animal 
Liberation one day (literally) in 1979 and saw 
ilmnediately that his position was correct, allhough I 
did not share his utilitarianism. (I am now somewhat 
less critical of utilitarianism. I should also note that the 
argumentsfrom sentiency and marginal cases defended 
by Singer were, as I later discovered, implicit ill several 
Greek thinkers who were obviously not utilitarians.) 
My present memory of the reading of this book is that 
I digested all of the steps in all of Singer's arguments 
in this 297 page book in one gulp. I am obviously 
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hyperbolizing here, but it is nonetheless true that I 
have never altered my view of any serious matter as 
quickly and as decisively as I did regarding animal 
rights (Singer would perhaps say "rights") upon 
reading Singer's book. He was so obviously correct, I 
thought, that I should never eat meat nor wear leather 
again. And I have not. 
Autobiographical writings like the present one are 
obvious occasions for self-deception or puffery. 
Perhaps historians of philosophy Or historians of ideas 
can mitigate these dangers by keeping in mind that 
their erudition is always somewhat eclectic and 
derivative. But it is precisely this eclecticism and 
derivativeness, I think, that makes history pertinent. 
Any thinker and writer who isnot an outright plagiarist 
is at least somewhat original, but not even the great 
thinkers are as original as their epigoni claim. I am 
convinced that philosophical originality, in general, 
and originality regarding animal rights issues, in 
particular, does not so much consist in new elements 
or conclusions as in the way in which previous 
elements or conclusions are reticulated, in the way in 
which the shards from the past-including the recent 
past-are glued together into a new vessel. There are 
a finite number of views on even complicated issues, 
and one's job is to negotiate one's way through the 
options, under the guidance of previous shipwrecks, 
to the option that is the best available. 
Thomas McFarland overstates the case a bit, but his 
view is worth consideration: 
What, indeed, do we all learn in the course of 
a scholarly training, but the conventions and 
gentilities of using other people's thoughts? 
Some we encase in footnotes, some we read, 
digest, and restate, some we simply regur-
gitate, but few people in this world, very few 
indeed, really have more than a genuine idea 
or two in a lifetime....We all know many 
things, but only one or two of those things, or 
none at all, originates with anyone of us. We 
all stand on the shoulders of others-of our 
predecessors and of our contemporaries-and 
we rightly condemn those who attempt to 
claim more.9 
Peter Singer is original as an interpreter of Bentham, 
Mill, Sidgwick, and recent ethicists; Tom Regan is 
brilliant in his use ofKant, Moore, and recent analytic 
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philosophers; etc. Historians ofphilosophy or historians 
of ideas are simply more explicit about their status as 
derivative than thinkers like Singer and Regan, and they 
are more aware of the fact that the desire for originality 
itself has a history. It should be noted that the most 
influential twentieth century philosophers have 
attempted to wipe the slate clean and to do philosophy 
from scratch (Moore, Wittgenstein, Russell, Husserl, 
Heidegger-in a strange way), but it is by no means 
clear that philosophy has progressed as much as these 
ahistoricists have predicted it would as a consequence 
of their mutually exclusive originalities. By way of 
contrast, I would cite the enormous originality of 
Whitehead in his self-proclaimed attempts to provide 
several important footnotes to Plato.JO 
Stephen R. L. Clark would, I assume, agree with 
the above quotations from Royce and McFarland, but 
he would incorporate them within a conservative 
political program wherein enlightenment and universal 
rights, including animal rights, are criticized. That is, 
Clark's favorable attitude toward animals arises in a 
MacIntyre-like way out of familial and parochial 
attachments, as when he emphasizes the fact that he 
is concerned primarily with British beasts. 11 My own 
liberal, rights-oriented view is that rights themselves 
are derived from traditional sources, say from the 
divine concern for individual souls evidenced in 
medieval thinkers, and perhaps also in ancient ones. 
Hence, in one sense my views of animals are closer to 
Clark's than to those of any other thinker in that both 
of us make claims that are rooted in the history of 
philosophy and both of us philosophize in a context 
of religious belief, but in another sense my (historically 
conditioned) liberalism puts me very much at odds 
with Clark's conservative thought. It is necessary that 
we start from some historical condition or other when 
we think (about animals or about anything else), but 
the sufficient conditions of any thinker's written work 
can only be supplied by decisions on the part of the 
thinker regarding how to react to those historical 
conditions (including, at times, the decision to reiterate 
the past in the present). 
Thus far I have not indicated very much about my 
personal life except to say that my views and practices 
regarding animals were transformed about sixteen years 
ago. Prior to that I was, naturally enough, born. This 
event occurred in 1953 in Philadelphia. My roots are in 
rough, lower middle class (at best) neighborhoods 
(Frankford, Bridesburg) in a rough city. I doubt if there 
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were very many animal rightists here, if only because 
the human beings in these neighborhoods lived lives 
only marginally better than those of animals in our 
culture. Three of my four grandparents worked full-
time as children, one from the age of eight in various 
sweat-shops, despite the fact that each of them possessed 
remarkable natural intelligence. FDR was something 
of a demigod in our house. 
Through heroic efforts on the part on my parents I 
was (positively) deracinated, to the extent that this is 
possible, and I learned two crucial lessons: (1) I was 
loved by them (to this day I am on a regular basis told 
by people that I seem to be the happiest person they 
know; make of this what you will); and (2) reading is 
the only way out of destitution if you are not a great 
athlete. I was good enough in athletics to be a high 
school star and a college player but not talented enough 
to go very far with a professional offer to play in the 
Mets organization. I have been reading ever since and 
playing pickup basketball. From athletics I have learned 
at least this much: defeats (even defeats in the effort to 
get fair treatment of animals) are not ultimate; in 
competitive athlein there is always a playful element 
ofdesporter. 12 
Three teachers of mine have influenced me most. 
One was a high school history teacher named Leonard 
Blostic, who as a Franciscan no doubt prepared the way 
for my later views regarding animals. A second was 
Erling Skorpen at the University of Maine, a latter-day 
Socrates who introduced me to philosophy. And the 
third was a graduate school teacher named Leonard 
Eslick, an ethereal Platonist and Whiteheadian who 
defined "body" as "frozen thought." All three of these 
have enhanced not only my elan vital but also my zest 
for the intellectual life, in particular. 
Buoyant personalities like mine are always open to 
the charge of superficiality, in that the suffering that is 
widespread in the world should, it is alleged, dissuade 
one from optimism. But, to paraphrase Wordsworth, 
listening to the sad music of sentient life is not 
necessarily· to despair; it is still possible to urge that 
"We will grieve not, rather find, strength in what remains 
behind." In any event, not everyone finds me buoyant 
and happy; university administrators almost always 
dislike me, a fact which I wear as a badge of honor. 
I do very little that is above and beyond the call of 
duty regarding animals, say like the supererogatory 
efforts of Lawrie and Susan Finsen to save strays. 
But I do perform my duty by not eating, wearing, 
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experimenting on, ...animals, and I do love to take long 
hikes in the mountains with "my" mutt Porterhouse. I 
also enjoy letting the cat into the house from the garage 
every morning at five (a time which Thoreau describes 
as "a cheerful invitation to make ... life of equal 
simplicity, and I may say innocence, with Nature"). 
There is something correct in Clark's critique of the 
philosophical tendency toward moral abstractions 
that are not rooted in some concrete familial or 
communal life. On the one hand, I am at least 
somewhat moral because I take seriously being a son, 
brother, husband, father of two (ages fifteen and 
twenty-one, the latter we adopted when he was ten 
after a brutal youth), cohabitant with nonhuman 
animals, and citizen. On the other hand, too much 
concern for partial affections can lead to narrow-
mindedness, tendentiousness, or nationalism rather 
than to universal concern for the rights of sentient 
creatures. In my own personal case, it is precisely 
because I was partially deracinated that I was able to 
escape factory work, at best, or prison, at worst. 
Both personal freedom and philosophical originality 
are, on my view, additions to the definiteness of past 
reality, 13 additions that can have the cumulative effect 
of significant change. Once absolute determinism and 
absolute freedom are rejected as defensible positions, 
it is easy to see that a qualified determinism is nothing 
other than a qualified indeterminism. As before, it is 
necessary that we work with some past or other in the 
effort to face the partial indeterminacy of the future. 
In my own life I have gone from ignorance of animal 
rights issues (yet a knowledge of Franciscanism) to 
knowledge of these issues, from knowledge of these 
issues to a defense of an animal rights stance, from 
this defense to the confidence that treatment of animal 
rights issues was intellectually respectable (and this 
largely due to reading James Rachels and to hearing a 
paper on zoos by Dale Jamieson), from a personal 
conviction that a defense of animal rights was 
intellectually respectable to the not quixotic hope that 
all rational people will eventually find such a defense 
convincing. Thinking in long stretches of time very 
often has its advantages. 
Those who think that, or act as if, it is "inevitable" 
that our future treatment of animals mirror our past 
treatment of them in effect have adopted a symmetrical 
view of time: the present's relationship to the future is 
every bit as determinate as the present's relationship to ' 
the past. (Hume, Russell, and some Buddhists seem to 
have a different, but an equally symmetrical, view: the 
present's relationship to the past is every bit as 
indeterminate as its relationship to the future.) My own 
view is an asymmetrical one, hence the title to this 
autobiography. We have a determinate relationship to 
the past in that historical abuses of animals cannot be 
undone; such abuses force one to admit that human 
relations with animals will always be tragic for anyone 
with memory. But the indeterminate relationship we 
have to the future is not negligible for the simple reason 
that the future is not here yet to be determined in detail. 
This indeterminacy should, in the long run, bode well 
for nonhuman animals. 
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